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In a variety of economies, the past two decades have witnessed sub-
stantial privatisation and regulation of previously state-owned monop-
olies. An important question for policy makers in such situations is
the design of the regulated industry: should it retain its monopoly sta-
tus (as British Gas did) or should it face immediate competition? An
important inﬂuence on this decision may be the degree of regulatory
capture in the privatised industry. Accordingly, we adapt Auriol and
Laﬀont’s [3] model of regulated industry design to allow for this eﬀect.
We ﬁnd that delegation to a benevolent regulator is welfare enhanc-
ing. A non-benevolent regulator (i.e. one open to capture) reduces
welfare because he requires costly incentive payments and outputs are
lower to reduce rents (thereby hurting consumers and ﬁrms). Auriol
and Laﬀont’s favouring of duopoly is strengthened in this case, which
raises interesting questions about the optimality of regulated industry
structures in a number of economies.
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∗PhD student in Economics1 Introduction
In a variety of economies, the past two decades have witnessed substan-
tial privatisation and regulation of previously state-owned monopolies. This
has been complemented by the introduction of independent regulators as a
means of overseeing the newly created industries. An important question
facing policy makers has been how should the post-privatisation industry be
designed? Should it retain its monopoly status (as British Gas did) or should
it face immediate competition (as did British Telecom)? However, the use of
independent regulators immediately introduces a complication because the
prospect of subsequent regulatory capture may inﬂuence the industry-design
decision.
This matter is recognised by Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers [1], who note
that it is diﬃcult to be clear about the eﬀects of possible political interference
when deciding on the structure of regulated industries. Real world illustra-
tions include the way in which political considerations may have inﬂuenced
the post-privatisation structure of UK gas and the electricity industries in
1986 and 1990 respectively (see [2, 10, 12]). According to Joskow[7], part
of the current Californian electricity crisis is explained by the way in which
interest groups inﬂuenced the structure of the industry. In Mexico political
restrictions impede the participation of private ﬁrms in natural gas produc-
1tion [4] and the reorganization of the electricity sector.
Similarly, the need to address concerns about capture of inde-
pendent regulators (through amendments to the regulator’s con-
tract) has been recognised in a variety of reguatory settings, be-
ginning with Laﬀont and Tirole (1993) who study the eﬀect of
capture in the regulation of a natural monopolistic industry in a
complete constitution approach framework, whose results opened
the discussion about the optimal institutional design. Laﬀont and
Martimort (1998) who study collusion and delegation, where they
discuss the internal organization of the ﬁrm, arguing that the com-
parison between a centralized and a decentralized hierarchical or-
ganization should be cast in terms of the agency costs associated
with the diﬀerent side-contracting games that agents play in these
organizations. Boyer and Laﬀont (1999) who consider the issue
for environmental regulation in a model of incomplete contracts,
ﬁnding that constitutional constraints on the instruments of en-
vironmental policy may be desirable, even though they appear
ineﬃcient from a standard economic viewpoint. Their justiﬁca-
tion lies in the limitations they impose on the politicians’ ability
to distribute rents. Martimort (1999) who study the life cycle of
regulatory agencies, where he analyses the dynamics of capture
2under transactions costs, resulting in that the design of regulatory
institutions play a role to increase the transaction costs of cap-
ture. Faure-Grimaud and Martimort (2003) who study the issue
of regulatory inertia, where they look at the eﬀects of regulatory
independence on the stability of the regulatory framework, ﬁnding
that even though regulatory independence enlarges collusive op-
portunities between regulated interest groups, it also constraints
future governments creating a stabilisation eﬀect.
Most of the works mentioned above, deal with the design of
an optimal regulatory framework under situations like capture and
renegotiation, and the impact of independent regulators over reg-
ulatory commitment. Our model form part of this literature, how-
ever, it contributes to it by incorporating the analysis of industry
design under political economy constraints.Most of the develop-
ments in the political economy of regulation, deal with the design
of an optimal regulatory framework under situations like capture
and renegotiation, and the impact of independent regulators over
regulatory commitment. Our model form part of this literature,
however, it contributes to it by incorporating the analysis of in-
dustry design under political economy constraints.
Given the above observations, the current paper presents a model of in-
3dustry design in the context of the potential for regulatory capture in the
newly privatised industry. In particular, we take Auriol and Laﬀont’s [3]
model of industry design where a government chooses between allowing a
monopoly or duopoly to produce a homogeneous product.1 We amend this
by recognising that the government may appoint a regulator because of the
latter’s expertise in discerning the characteristics of ﬁrms on the industry.
The regulator is intended to report this information truthfully but may be
captured by the industry and, therefore, choose not to do so. This must be
borne in mind when the government decides whether the industry should
be privatised as a monopoly or an oligopoly.2 Thus, our paper serves two
purposes: it addresses an issue of policy-relevance in many countries, and
contributes to a growing recent literature on the relationship between opti-
mal regulation and questions of political economy.
In Auriol and Laﬀont the decision to choose duopoly over monopoly is
determined by two eﬀects: a “sampling eﬀect” and a “yardstick eﬀect”. The
former allows the regulator to drop a potentially high-cost competitor; the
latter permits him to benchmark the ﬁrms’ price/output decisions. These
are then weighed against the undesirability of duplicated ﬁxed costs if the
duopoly setting is chosen. We ﬁnd that the introduction of political con-
1Dana [6] considers a similar issue in the context of product diﬀerentiation.
2Formally, we use a ‘complete contract’ model of capture: see Laﬀont [9]
4straints alters the balance between these two eﬀects in favour of a more
competitive regulated industry. The reason for this is The reason for this is
that, in general, political economy constraints produce a strength
of the sampling eﬀect compared to asymmetric information, and
if the capture parameter reduces monopoly quantities more than
duopoly quantities the yardstick competition eﬀect is positive and
increasing with the level of capture. We suggest that our results provide
interesting insights into several industry design decisions: for example, the
fact that Mexican natural gas distribution in two of the main cities of the
country involves potentially competing duopolists despite obvious elements
of natural monopoly3 and the opposite design decision taken in the UK when
British Gas was privatised, as well as the existence of parallel transmission
lines in Germany and the USA and the duopoly policy followed in the in the
British telecommunications industry.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model, sec-
tions 3 and 4 derive results for the monopoly and duopoly cases respectively.
Section 5 compares both industry structures and ﬁnally section 6 concludes.
3Monterrey city has two main distribution lines Gas de Monterrey and CFE. Mexico
City was divided into four zones for distribution, opening the possibility for oligopolistic
competition in the future.
52 The model
An industry has been privatised and the Government (G) must decide whether
it should operate as a monopoly or a homogeneous goods duopoly. Whatever
the arrangement, an independent regulator (R) has been appointed to over-
see the market. As we shall see, the ﬁrm(s) enjoy private information about
the costs of production though R receives a signal about this and reports
it back to G. This signal is noisy which raises the prospect of asymmetric
information prevailing once it is received. As always (see Laﬀont and Tirole),
a familiar information rent accrues to low-cost production under asymmet-
ric information and this may create an incentive for R to collude with the
ﬁrm(s) and report an uninformative signal to G despite having received a
revealing one. Recognising this, G must design a suitable contract for R and
our interest is in the eﬀect this has on G’s choice between a monopoly and
duopoly industry structure. Thus, in setting out the model, we ﬁrst look at
the ﬁrm(s)’s output decision, then set out R’s monitoring technology, before
ﬁnally speciﬁng G’s problem.
2.1 Firms’ output decisions
Consider, with Auriol and Laﬀont, a market that can be served by one or two
ﬁrms, 1 and 2, selling homogeneous output. Consumption generates gross
6surplus S(q1 + q2) for qi ≥ 0, i = 1,2, for consumers, so P(q) = S0(q) is the
inverse demand function. Firm i faces costs given by Ci(βi,qi) + K, where
βi ∈ [β,β] and K is identical for both ﬁrms. Output is chosen to maximise
Firm i’s rent, U(βi) = t + P(q)qi − Ci(βi,qi) − K where t is a transfer from
G and q ≡ q1 + q2.
Variable costs are observable, outputs are veriﬁable while βi is private
information for Firm i. However, the βi’s are correlated in a commonly
understood way so it may be possible to infer something about them from
observable information. To see this, let βi = αb + (1 − α)i,α ∈ [0,1],i =
1,2. Here, α is the correlation between β1 and β2, b is a common factor
aﬀecting costs and the ’s are stochastically independent random shocks. We
let b ∈ [b,b] and v = Pr(b = b). Given the above, the range of βi, i = 1,2 is




b − b +  − 
Thus, with this assumption, when the ﬁrms discover their β’s they can infer
the value of the common factor b.
72.2 The Regulator (R)
Unlike models of regulation without the prospects of capture, R’s role in
the current setting is to discern information about the cost of production
and relay this to G, who then sets industry structure and contracts for the
ﬁrm(s). The supervision technology follows Laﬀont [9] involves R receiving
signal σ = β with probability ζ, so R is fully informed, and a signal σ = ∅
with probability (1−ζ), in which case the signal is uninformative4. We shall
consider two types of R: a benevolent one, who always reports the signal
truthfully, and a self-interested one, who may choose not to do this.
2.3 The Government (G)
The Government oﬀers contracts to the ﬁrm(S) of the following type: t =
K + U(B) + Bq − P(q)q, with ˙ U(B) = −q(B) and ˙ q(B) ≤ 0, depending on
whether the industry operates as a monopoly or a duopoly. The contracts
maximise welfare, given by5:
W = V (q) + U(q) = S(q) + λP(q)q − (1 + λ)(Bq + K) − λU(B) (1)
4A footnote: notice that this information technology implies that when the true pa-
rameter is B=Bhigh the signal is equal to the empty set.
5Where: V (q) = S(q) − P(q)q − (1 + λ)t is consumers’ welfare and U(q) =
t + P(q)q − Bq − K is the ﬁrms’ utility.
8Subject to incentive rationality and incentive compatibility constraints.
The choice between monopoly and duopoly is then determined by which
generates the highest ex ante welfare.
3 Regulation of monopoly
3.1 The benchmark case: Benevolent regulation
Suppose that the industry operates as a monopoly and that R reports the
signal he receives truthfully; hence, G is fully informed when β = β but faces
asymmetric information otherwise. As is familiar from Laﬀont and Tirole [8],
full information means that G maximises equation (1) subject to U(β) = 0:
call the solution W FI. Under asymmetric information, G maximises the
expectation of equation (1) conditional on the information that is contained
in the signal, subject to incentive compatibility and individual rationality
constraints: call this E(β≥β|σ=∅)W AI. Thus, in total, G maximises ζW FI+(1−
ζ)E(β≥β|σ=∅)W AI subject to incentive compatibility and individual rationality




















ζf(σ)f(β) + (1 − ζ)f(σ,β)
(2)
where qb
M(β) is the quantity produced by the monopolist under a benevolent
R. Equation (2) is an amended Ramsey formula. To understand it, note
that when ζ = 1 we have the usual Ramsey expression associated with full
information; when ζ = 0, the ﬁnal expression equals 1 and Ramsey formula
is amended by inclusion of the hazard
F(β)
f(β). We can show that qb
M is greater
than the output arising under the asymmetric information in the monopoly
case qAI
M . This is because under delegation to a benevolent R, some
good types are expected to be discovered as such with probabil-
ity ζ, therefore G is able to permit a higher level of q. Welfare
under delegation dominates asymmetric information because the
expected rents are lower under delegation compared to asymmet-
ric information7.
6It is readily shown that this is larger than the asymmetric information welfare arising
in the absence of delegation to R: see Laﬀont (REF). Thus, delegation is valuable to G.
7This is a standard result shown in [9]
103.2 Non-benevolent regulation
When R is self-interested, there are strong incentives for collusion with the










with probability (1 − ζ). The maximum amount of money that the ﬁrm is
willing to oﬀer to R is a bribe of U(β) with a value to R of kU(β), where
k = 1
1+λc and λc is an exogenous transaction cost of the side-payment.
Now G must provide incentives to R to prevent this capture. In particular,
a payment of ˆ s = kU(β) is required. With this, R is indiﬀerent between truth
and collusion and chooses the former, by assumption. The expected social
cost is λζˆ s, because the payment occurs with probability ζ and has a social
cost λ.







[S(qM(β)) + λP(qM(β))qM(β) − (1 + λ)(βqM(β) + K)]dF(β)
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M(β) is the monopoly output under a non-benevolent R. Several
possibilities arise. To begin, suppose that λc ' ∞ so that k ' 0. Here, R
is of maximum use because collusion is inﬁnitely costly to the ﬁrm. Setting
k = 0 in (4) returns (2) and qnb
M = qb
M. Further, ζ = 1 returns the First-Best
a of benevolent regulation with a revealing signal.
Second, when transactions costs λc ' 0 (so k ' 1), the situation is as if no
delegation had taken place: collusion is so ‘easy’ that it cannot be prevented.























ζf(σ)f(β) + (1 − ζ)f(σ,β)
) (5)








provided that 0 <
f(σ,β)
f(σ)f(β) ≤ 1. In spite of facing a completely captured R,
the probability of facing a good type makes G distort production less.
This result is consistent with Laﬀont[9], Laﬀont and Tirole[8] and Tirole[11].
As a response to the possibility of capture, G adopts two mechanisms8: (i) To
give incentives to R with a positive expected social cost; and (ii) To reduce
the stake of collusion. Which is done by increasing price and reducing the
quantities produced (qnb
M ≤ qb
M), since rents are increasing in quantities, the
ﬁrm suﬀers from collusion as well.
8A third mechanism could be to increase the costs of collusion λc, but these have been
considered exogenous in this model.
134 Delegation under duopoly
Auriol and Laﬀont[3] assume that R is able to observe α the correlation of β
types, having three cases: 1) For α = 1 the Cramer-McLean[3, 5] condition
holds and no rents are given up to the most eﬃcient ﬁrm. 2) For 0 < α < 1
R is able to cut rents provided that βi ∈ A2
9. And 3) For α = 0 there is no
correlation between types and it is not possible to cut rents. Under duopoly
only the sampling eﬀect takes place.
In this section we drop this last assumption and we assume that G needs
an informed R to have information about the correlation of types. Under this
















d ˆ F(B) (6)
Where (i = 1,2) stands for ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2, and B = (β1,β2). Thus, the
only motivation for G in regulating by duopoly with no delegation comes
from the sampling eﬀect; that is, to have the most eﬃcient monopoly at the
cost of the duplication of ﬁxed costs. However, with the use of an informed
9In that case given the stochastic structure assumed by Auriol and Laﬀont[3] the
Cramer-MalLean condition does not hold.
10The idea is that with no R, although G can expect some correlation to exist, ﬁrms
can always argue (in court) that correlation is zero, and G has no information to build
a counterargument. Some diﬃculties for yardstick competition to be implemented come
from this issue.
14R, G is able to cut expected rents subject to the information technology
available and the scope for discretionary behavior by R.
Following Laﬀont[9], we deﬁne the supervision technology as follows. G
requires an informed R, in this case R is not able to see ﬁrms types directly,
but a hard signal of the correlation of these types. Then: a) with probability
ξ R observes σ = α and with probability z, 0 < α ≤ 1. And b) with
probability (1 − ξ) R observes σ = ∅ and with probability (1 − z), α = 011.
If α = 0 then σ = ∅ always.
4.1 Benevolent (R)
Proceeding as in the monopoly case, ﬁrst we check whether R is useful. If R
is benevolent, with probability (ξz) the Constitution is fully informed about
α and with probability (1 − ξz) she is not informed. Notice that in this
context, full information is more limited since R is not able to see the exact
level of correlation, she can observe only an interval of it; in particular she is
not able to see whether α = 1 in which case she could be able to extract all
Rents.
As before we have two cases. First, under full information welfare is
deﬁned as:















1(B) + K + β
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2)]d ˆ F(B) (7)
Notice that in our context, full information means the ability of R to observe
















d ˆ F(B) (8)
where as in Auriol and Laﬀont’s[3] IA2 = 1 when ﬁrm i = 1, respectively ﬁrm
i = 2, is in A2 and IA2 = 0 otherwise. This event happens with probability
(ξz).
Second, under asymmetric information there is no need to revise expecta-
tions since G is not able to cut rents according to expectations12, so rents in
this case are given by equation (6) and expected welfare under asymmetric
information is:












































d ˆ F(B) (10)
This event happens with probability (1−ξz). Thus, total expected welfare
is given by:
ξzW
FI + (1 − ξz)W
AI






















This means that when the most eﬃcient ﬁrm is in A1 then R is neutral to
17the yardstick competition eﬀect, because there is no way to cut rents, due to
the fact that there is no truncation of the hazard rate. For the most eﬃcient
ﬁrm being in A2, delegation is always useful provided that 0 < ξz ≤ 1 , since
R gives information about correlation and it permits G to cut rents13.
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F min(B) − ξzIA2(min(B))F(a)
f min(B)
(13)
For ξz = 0 the situation is as if there is no R; for ξz = 1 we are back in
the situation in which G can observe 0 < α ≤ 1 as in Auriol and Laﬀont[3].
13Notice that delegation is useful as long as it provides information about cost correlation
of ﬁrms, however the sampling eﬀect exists independently of delegation and/or correlation.
184.2 Non-benevolent R
Once again, however, there is scope for collusion when R receives the signal
about α. If σ = α and 0 < α < 1, then G can cut rents from equation (10)
to equation (8)14 for ﬁrm one or two.
So, for 0 < α ≤ 1 there are incentives for R to report r = ∅ when she has





























For R, the value of the bribe is kˆ s, as before.
In order to avoid collusion G can give a transfer to R which has expected
social value of λξzkˆ s, since λ is the social cost of the transfer and ξz is
the probability of the transfer to take place. G maximizes expected social
welfare:
14For α = 1 rents are zero
15Notice that the observation of the correlation parameter is still hard information for
G in the sense that R cannot change the information received, in particular if she has




FI + (1 − ξz)W
AI − λξzkˆ s (14)
and the result is:
P(qnb





















[k − 1] (15)
We can deﬁne two extreme cases:
1. When the transaction costs are very large, for example in the extreme
case that λc = ∞, k = 0, G is as if it were facing a benevolent R,
equation (13).
2. In the other extreme if λc = 0, then k = 1 there are no transaction
costs of capture. It is too easy for the ﬁrm to capture R that it is better
for G not to avoid capture. In that case the solution is as that with no
R:
P(qnb
















20Again as in the monopoly case, in response to collusion G: 1) Gives, at
an expected social cost, incentives to R to avoid collusion. 2) Reduces the
stake of collusion by reducing qD due to the fact that rents are increasing in
quantities. Consumers and ﬁrms are damaged by the risk of collusion. The
ﬁrst best in this framework (which is in reality a second best) is attained
when ξz = 1 and k = 0. Since G is able to maximize the cutting of rents for
β1 ∈ A2, respectively β2 ∈ A2.
5 The comparison
5.1 Level of duplication of ﬁxed costs
Auriol and Laﬀont [3] obtained four pricing equations shown in table (1),
next page. Taking those equations and looking at the quantities produced
under each industry structure and informational environment, they are able
to determine the level of duplication of ﬁxed costs that R could permit, due
to the reduction in rents under duopoly structure.
Introducing delegation in an asymmetric information environment we also
obtained four pricing equations shown in table (2).We intent to follow Auriol
and Laﬀont’s procedure to determine the level of duplication of ﬁxed costs
that G is able to permit under a non-benevolent R. Therefore, we study the



































a Monopoly Full Information.
b Monopoly Asymmetric Information.
c Duopoly Full Information.
d Duopoly Asymmetric Information.
























































D ) [k − 1]
a Monopoly Benevolent R .
b Monopoly Non-benevolent R.
c Duopoly Benevolent R.
d Duopoly Non-benevolent R.
quantities produced in each industry structure. Through this procedure we
expect to determine the eﬀects that delegation and capture have over the
level of permissible duplication of ﬁxed costs, and with that the likelihood
for G of selecting duopoly over monopoly when capture is present.
From Auriol and Laﬀont [3] we have the duplication of ﬁxed costs as16:
16To derive the duplication of ﬁxed costs they use the following results: q∗
D =
q∗




D (β)) − qAI
M (β))F min(B)















[F min(B) − F(β)]dβ (AL.5)
After doing some remarks about diﬀerent restrictive conditions of the
model17, their main conclusion is that, in general, asymmetric information
favours the duopolistic structure when the market structure is chosen ex-ante.
In our case, the level of duplication of ﬁxed costs under asymmetric in-




D (β) − qnb
M(β)]F min(B)






























(F min(B) − F(β))dβ (17)
As expected, the duplication of ﬁxed costs in this context is aﬀected
again by the yardstick competition eﬀect under non-benevolent R Y nb, (ﬁrst
17In their framework an extra condition for duopoly to dominate monopoly as the de-
cision taken by R about industry structure, is that the yardstick competition eﬀect to
dominate the weakening of the sampling eﬀect under asymmetric information, relative to
full information.
23integral in equation (17)) and the sampling eﬀect under non-benevolent R
Snb, (second integral in the same equation). Both eﬀects are now aﬀected,
directly and indirectly, by the value of the parameters; therefore, we need
to analyze analise, not only the direct change in Y nb and Snb for changes
in the parameters, but also the change in quantities when the parameters
change. The sampling eﬀect, as in Auriol and Laﬀont’s model, is divided in
two parts: the quantity eﬀect and the rent eﬀect. However, unlike in that the
model, the rent eﬀect is now aﬀected by additional terms coming from the
conditional probabilities and the parameters18 ζ and k. Therefore, equation
(18) provides the condition for the sampling eﬀect under a non-benevolent
R to dominate the sampling eﬀect under asymmetric information and no
delegation.
18Notice that the term in big brackets for the sampling eﬀect is the derivative of the
hazard rate (which is positive by assumption) times the weighted conditional probability
g(β < β|σ = ∅), plus the derivative of the conditional probability with respect to β, times
the hazard rate. The derivative of the weighted conditional probability with respect to β
may be negative as the probability of β = β given that σ = ∅ increases as β increases.
This could make the rent eﬀect to be negative since the hazard rate grows very fast. An
explanation of a negative rent eﬀect is the following: given that some good types are
discovered as such, the change of the conditional probability of β given σ = ∅ is negative;
this produces a negative rent eﬀect since being the ﬁrm already eﬃcient there is a waste











































(F min(B) − F(β))dβ (18)
For the yardstick eﬀect, it is necessary to check the eﬀects that the diﬀer-
ent values of the parameters have over qnb
M and qnb
D , we found that for qnb
D > qnb
M
equation (19) must hold. From our analysis we found that the yardstick ef-
fect could be negative for some values of the parameters. However, if the
strengthening of the sampling eﬀect under non-benevolent R dominates the
weakening of the yardstick eﬀect under non-benevolent R, the optimal con-










ζf(σ)f(β) + (1 − ζ)f(σ,β)
)




















25As a general result we have that when the yardstick competition eﬀect is
positive, then G decision is biased towards duopoly since, for λ small enough
and qnb
M > qAI
M , under delegation to a non-benevolent R the sampling eﬀect
is always strengthened compared to asymmetric information. Under certain
values of the parameters the yardstick competition eﬀect could be negative,
however, G can still admit a positive level of duplication of ﬁxed costs if
the strengthening of the sampling eﬀect under non-benevolent R compared
to asymmetric information is bigger than the weakening of the yardstick
competition eﬀect. However, given the complexity of the relationships a
numerical simulation is required to get a better picture of our conclusions.
5.2 Numerical simulation
We pursued a numerical simulation, assuming an exponential distribution
function for the β types. We developed from it the required conditional and
marginal distribution functions. The results are shown in tables (3), (4) and
(5), in the next pages.
From table (3), we can observe that the duplication of ﬁxed costs increases
as capture increases for a given level of productivity γ, where 1/γ is the
average productivity. However, for a high level of productivity, the level
of duplication of ﬁxed costs is reduced drastically, presenting even negative
26Table 3: Duplication of ﬁxed costs non-benevolent Ra
γ = 0.25 γ = 0.5 γ = 0.75 γ = 1 γ = 1.5
k=0 2.7126 3.835 4.1433 3.7411 -2.5750
k=0.2 2.7667 3.9539 4.3626 4.1286 -1.3552
k=0.5 2.8476 4.1317 4.6902 4.7007 0.4656
k=0.7 2.9014 4.2500 4.9078 5.0910 1.6736
k=0.8 2.9283 4.3090 5.0163 5.2824 2.2759
k=0.9 2.9552 4.3679 5.1247 5.4735 2.8770
k=1 2.9821 4.4268 5.2329 5.6642 3.4770
a The parameter k represents the level of capture. For the simulation F(β) is
assumed to be exponential, so γ is the parameter of the exponential cumu-
lative distribution function, 1
γ is the average marginal cost. The higher γ
the lower the marginal cost.
Table 4: Condition for Snb to dominate SAIa
γ = 0.25 γ = 0.5 γ = 0.75 γ = 1 γ = 1.5
k=0 0.2964 0.3467 0.3203 0.3075 1.2648
k=0.2 0.3003 0.3587 0.3404 0.3329 1.2867
k=0.5 0.3060 0.3763 0.3692 0.3684 1.3107
k=0.7 0.3098 0.3877 0.3876 0.3904 1.3209
k=0.8 03116 0.3933 0.3965 0.4008 1.3242
k=0.9 0.3135 0.3989 0.4053 0.4108 1.3264
k=1 0.3153 0.4043 0.4139 0.4206 1.3275
a The parameter k represents the level of capture. For the simulation F(β) is
assumed to be exponential, so γ is the parameter of the exponential cumu-
lative distribution function, 1
γ is the average marginal cost. The higher γ
the lower the marginal cost.
27.
Table 5: Condition for strengthening of Snb to dominate
the weakening of Y nb(a)
γ = 0.25 γ = 0.5 γ = 0.75 γ = 1 γ = 1.5
k=0 0.0702 -0.3996 -0.3932 -1.1625 -6.8657
k=0.2 0.1243 0.0792 -0.1739 -0.7751 -5.6459
k=0.5 0.2052 0.2570 0.1538 0.9334 -3.8251
k=0.7 0.2591 0.3752 0.3714 0.1874 -2.6171
k=0.8 0.2860 0.4342 0.4799 0.3788 -2.0148
k=0.9 0.3130 0.4932 0.5883 0.5698 -1.4137
k=1 0.3398 0.5520 0.6965 0.7606 -0.8137
a The parameter k represents the level of capture. For the simulation F(β) is
assumed to be exponential, so γ is the parameter of the exponential cumula-
tive distribution function, 1
γ is the average marginal cost. The higher γ the
lower the marginal cost.
numbers for low levels of capture.
In table (4), we observe the condition for the sampling eﬀect under non-
benevolent R to dominate the sampling eﬀect under asymmetric information.
In our example, the condition holds for any value of k and γ.
Finally, in table (5), we corroborate that the strengthening of the sam-
pling eﬀect under non-benevolent R dominates the weakening of the yardstick
eﬀect under non-benevolent R. We found that, for a given level of produc-
tivity, the strengthening of the sampling eﬀect increases its power as capture
increases. However, for a given level of capture, an increase in productivity
produces a non-linear eﬀect in the condition. In any case, when produc-
tivity is very high the weakening of the sampling eﬀect dominates and the
monopolistic structure is preferred.
286 Conclusions
In this paper we have analysed regulation by duopoly under political econ-
omy constraints, we have built our model on Auriol and Laﬀont’s model of
regulation by duopoly and Laﬀont’s model of capture under a complete con-
tract approach with hard information. First, we introduced delegation and
later we allowed for a non-benevolent R.
We found that delegation to a benevolent R increases welfare under
monopoly and duopoly structures. Furthermore, a benevolent R increases
quantities under both structures so that there is a strengthening of the sam-
pling eﬀect and a positive yardstick competition eﬀect. The resulting impli-
cation is that the level of duplication of ﬁxed costs is increased compared to
asymmetric information.
Under a non-benevolent R there is a reduction in welfare compared to
the benevolent case, since G has to give incentives to R to deliver true in-
formation. The reduction in welfare comes from three sources: the social
cost of the incentive payments, the reduction in consumer surplus due to
the reduction in quantities and the reduction in producer surplus due to the
reduction in rents. Consumers and ﬁrms suﬀer from capture.
It is not straightforward to derive analytical conclusions about the overall
eﬀects of capture on the desirable level of duplication of ﬁxed costs. However,
29we have seen that for certain values of the parameters there is a strengthening
of the sampling eﬀect compared to asymmetric information and if capture
reduces monopoly quantities more than duopoly quantities the yardstick com-
petition eﬀect is positive and increasing with the level of capture. In such a
case, duopoly dominates monopoly as the level of capture increases. Thus,
political economy strengthens Auriol and Laﬀont’s ﬁndings that duopoly is
the welfare-dominant industry structure. The results of the numerical simu-
lation support our observations.
Our model abstracts from a number of issues and, as such, raises several
questions for future research. For instance, why have countries like England
and France allowed duopolistic structures in their telecommunication sectors,
or Germany and USA allowed for duplication of ﬁxed costs in some natural
gas transmission lines? Does it mean that there is more capture in those
countries, than for example in some developing economies that preserved
monopolistic structures in those sectors?
One interesting possibility is that the ‘stake of collusion’ is higher in more
developed countries. Alternatively, perhaps these countries governments are
more constrained by their constituencies, so that they face more pressures to
set the optimal contract. In less developed countries, governments with less
pressures are more discretionary and are able to avoid the optimal contract.
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